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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Hassan lcanovic appeals from the district court's order dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court set forth the underlying facts and course of proceedings
of the case in its Notice Of Intent To Summarily Dismiss Petition For Post
Conviction Relief:
Petitioner was charged with Attempted Strangulation,
Felony, and Domestic Battery, Misdemeanor, by an Information
filed on May 28, 2009. On June 25, 2009, pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement, the Petitioner entered a plea of "guilty" to the
charge of Domestic Violence, Felony, and the State filed an
Amended Information in open court. The Court accepted the guilty
plea following an examination of the Petitioner under oath and
waiver of applicable rights. On September 2, 2009, Petitioner came
before the Court for sentencing. At that time, the Court heard
statements from both counsel. The Court sentenced Petitioner to a
period of incarceration of eight years, with the first three years
fixed, however the Court retained jurisdiction. On September 14,
2009, the United States Bureau of Homeland Security Department
of Immigration and Customs provided the Petitioner and the Court a
notice of detainer. On February 18, 2010, the Court suspended the
sentence and placed the Defendant on probation for a period of ten
years. The Petitioner is currently housed at the Utah County Jail
pursuant to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detainer. The Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
(R., pp. 15-16.)

lcanovic filed a petition for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit.
(R., pp. 3-9.) In his petition, lcanovic claimed:

1)
Attorney Jared Martens' representation fell below the
minimum level of competent assistance and provided ineffective
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assistance of counsel to the Petitioner during the course of the
aforesaid criminal proceeding in the following ways:
a)

When questioned specifically by the Petitioner
if his guilty plea and/or conviction would result
in him being deported to Bosnia, Mr. Martens
advised the Petitioner that it would not.

b)

When questioned specifically by the Petitioner
if his guilty plea and/or conviction would result
in him losing his ability to apply for United
States citizenship, Mr. Martens advised the
Petitioner that it would not.

2)
The petitioner's guilty plea was not made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.
(R., p. 4.) In his supporting affidavit, lcanovic stated:
6)
Prior to entering my plea of guilty, I specifically asked Mr.
Martens if my guilty plea and/or conviction would result in me being
deported to Bosnia. Mr. Martens advised me that it would not.
7)
Prior to entering my guilty plea, I specifically asked Mr.
Martens if my guilty plea and/or conviction would result in me losing
my ability to apply for United States citizenship. Mr. Martens
advised me that it would not.

12)
But for Mr. Martens' advisement, I would not have pied
guilty.
(R., p. 8.)

The court thereafter filed a notice of intent to summarily dismiss

lcanovic's petition. (R., pp. 15-22.) In its notice, the court discussed Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and noted that to prevail lcanovic must prove
both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced him. (R., p. 18.) The court also discussed the recent
United States Supreme Court case, Padilla v. Kentucky, -- US--, 130 S.Ct. 1473
(2010), in which the Court determined that advice regarding deportation
2

consequences falls under the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. (R., p. 18.)
The district court then held, "[a)ccepting the Petitioner's allegations as
true, a direct representation that his pending criminal charges would have no risk
of adverse immigration consequences would constitute representation below an
objective standard of reasonableness under Padilla." (R., pp. 18-19.) The court,
however, failed to find any resulting prejudice from lcanovic's attorney's
performance.

(R., pp. 19-20.)

It explained that at lcanovic's change of plea

hearing it advised lcanovic that his plea of guilty "may result in deportation,
inability to obtain legal status or denial of an application for United States
citizenship."

(R., p. 19.)

It concluded, "even accepting the Petitioner's

allegations as true, the Court finds that the trial counsel's deficient performance
was remedied by the Court." {R., pp. 19-20.)
lcanovic filed a response in which he discussed Padilla in detail and
asserted that the district court's advisement did not remedy lcanovic's attorney's
wrong

advice and that he was therefore prejudiced

by his attorney's

performance. (R., pp. 27-34.)
A hearing was held on the matter. (See generally Tr.) lcanovic was not
present at the hearing and his attorney based his arguments on lcanovic's
previously-filed affidavit. (Tr., p. 2, L. 17 - p. 3, L. 23.) lcanovic's former attorney
testified:
Do you recall if you had conversations with Mr. lcanovic
regarding the possibility of deportation as a result of a guilty plea
and conviction in this case?
Q.

3

A.
yes.

I remember it being an issue that he was concerned about,

Q.
What makes you - what do you remember about that? What
stands out in your mind?

A.
Well, the other client that I was representing he had an ICE
hold and they were friends. And so he was concerned that perhaps
he would end up being deported as well. And I think that he had
asked me about it. Was concerned that his guilty plea and the
sentencing that he was going to ultimately end up getting deported
like some others that he knew had.
Q.
And what was your response to him when he expressed
those concerns to you?

A.
My response to that would have been you know, I don't
know. They might. They might not.
Q.

So you weren't aware if he would affirmatively be deported?

A.
I would never tell somebody you affirmatively are not going
to be deported because one, I'm not an immigration attorney. I
know enough about the federal system and immigration to know
that you can't definitively say you are or you are not going to be
deported. Even if they say you are going to be deported, you may
not be deported. If they say - you just can't make that kind of
statement. I know I didn't make that statement because there is no
way that I could know that.

(Tr., p. 12, L. 9 - p. 13, L. 17.)
Q.
So there is the affidavit from Mr. lcanovic that states he
specifically asked you if his plea or conviction would result in him
being deported and he states that you advised him that he would
not; is that true?

A.
I know that there is no way that it is true because I know that
I wouldn't make that kind of a definitive statement.
Q.

Okay. He also -

A.

Because there is no way that I could know for sure.

Q.
All right. Now, he also states that he specifically asked you if
his guilty plea or conviction would result in him losing his ability to
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apply for United States citizenship and that you advised him that it
would not?
A.
As for that I don't remember that discussion. I don't even
remember that discussion going on. But again, where I'm not an
immigration attorney, don't know that area of the law well enough, I
don't think I would have given him that kind of advice on that.
Probably would have referred him to an immigration attorney on
that, especially on that issue.
Q.
Do you recall his response to you once you gave him that
advice that there was the possibility that it could result in
deportation, his conviction?

A.

I don't specifically remember his response, no.

Q.

Do you recall -

A.

I think he was hopeful that he wouldn't be deported.

Q.
Okay. That's - he had indicated to you that he was hoping
that it wouldn't result in that?
A.

Yeah.

Do you recall how many conversations that you had with him
about this issue? The possibility of being deported?
Q.

I don't remember specifically how many. At least a couple of
discussions we talked about it. But I can't give you a number
beyond that, I don't know.
A.

(Tr., p. 14, L. 12 - p. 16, L. 5.) No other witnesses testified. At the conclusion of
the evidence, the district court denied lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief
and held:
The Court finds Mr. Martens' testimony credible that he
would not have told his client there would be no immigration
consequences.
However, an attorney's inaccurate advice may be cured by
accurate advice from the court. Navarez, N-A-V-A-R-E-Z, v. State,
145 Idaho 878, 187 Pacific Third 1253, Idaho Court of Appeals
decided in 2008.
5

Where the Court clearly and accurately explains the
consequences of a plea, the effect of counsel's inaccurate advice is
cured.
Here, I don't find that there was inaccurate advice. But even
were there inaccurate advice, the Court believes that that
inaccurate advice is cured by this Court's questioning of the
defendant.
If the deficient performance of counsel is cured by the
Court's statement post-conviction relief should be denied.

Since any potentially inadequate advice by counsel was
cured by the Court's admonition to the defendant the Court should
deny relief.
(Tr., p. 35, L. 16 - p. 37, L. 15.) The district court later entered an order formally
dismissing lcanovic's petition. (R., p. 48.) lcanovic timely appealed. (R., pp. 4446.)

6

ISSUE
lcanovic states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. lcanovic's Petition
For Post Conviction Relief?
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has lcanovic failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

7

ARGUMENT
lcanovic Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of His Petition For PostConviction Relief

A.

Introduction
lcanovic asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for

post-conviction relief, arguing, as he did below, that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Padilla, his attorney was deficient for failing to advise him of the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea and he would not have pied guilty
had he been correctly advised. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-21.) The district court
did not err, however, because Padilla does not meet the applicable test for
retroactive application. Therefore lcanovic is not entitled to relief based on its
holding. As such, lcanovic has failed to establish that the district court erred in
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). When the district court
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
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testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters
solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95,
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

A trial court's decision that a post-

conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

The Holding Of Padilla Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For
Retroactive Application
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)). Where the petitioner alleges
entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to
prevail, the petitioner "must establish that his counsel was deficient in his
performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice to the claimant."
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,922,828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). "There is a strong
presumption

that counsel's

performance falls within the wide

range of

professional assistance and the defendant bears the burden of proving that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."

l9..c

(citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989)). In addition, it
is well-established that "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to
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evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Maxfield v. State,
108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original)).
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must "show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient
performance." McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Row,
131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998)). "'A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."'

19.:.

(quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's
advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations
omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances." Padilla at 1485 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
lcanovic's entire claim for relief is premised on retroactive application of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Padilla. Because the holding of Padilla does not
meet the applicable test for retroactive application, lcanovic is not entitled to relief
as a matter of law.
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1.

Overview of Padilla v. Kentucky

In Padilla, the Court considered whether defense counsel has an
obligation to advise his client that a guilty plea would make him subject to
automatic deportation.

Padilla pied guilty to drug trafficking in Kentucky state

court and, although a lawful permanent resident of the United States, he was
subject to removal because of his drug conviction.

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478.

Padilla sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id.

Padilla argued he entered his guilty plea in reliance on his counsel's

erroneous advice that the plea would not affect his immigration status.

~

The

Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla post-conviction relief and held that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not protect
him from erroneous advice regarding the collateral consequences of a conviction
such as deportation or removal.

~

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.

It found

"constitutionally competent counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his
conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation."
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. The Court noted that many state and federal courts
had concluded that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel was limited to advice about the direct consequences of a guilty plea,
and did not extend to information regarding collateral consequences.

~

at 1481.

However, it nonetheless concluded that "advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
~

at 1482. The Court explained that it had "never applied a distinction between
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direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally
'reasonable professional assistance' required under Strickland."

kl

at 1481. It

declined to consider the appropriateness of the direct/collateral distinction
generally and found such a distinction to be "ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland
claim concerning the specific risk of deportation."

&

at 1481-82.

The Court based its conclusion on the "unique nature" of deportation, and
specifically focused on its severity as a penalty and its close relationship to the
criminal process.

kl

at 1481. The Court discussed recent changes in federal

immigration law and explained that these changes further "enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation" by making "removal nearly an
automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders."

kl

at 1478-81. The

Court held that "deportation is an integral part ... of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes" and
cannot be "divorce[d] ... from the conviction."

kl

at 1480-81.

The Court

concluded that Strickland thus applied to Padilla's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
The Court next considered whether Padilla established the first Strickland
prong - whether his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

In determining the reasonableness of Padilla's attorney's

representation, the Court looked to the prevailing professional norms set forth by
the American Bar Association and numerous other authorities.

kl at

1482, 1485.

The Court found that, dating back to the mid-1990s, those authorities have been
in agreement that counsel must advise his client regarding the risks of
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deportation.

Id.

It explained that if Padilla's counsel consulted the removal

statutes he would have easily determined that Padilla's guilty plea would make
his removal virtually mandatory and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
do so. l,Q at 1483. The Court held, "when the deportation consequence is truly
clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear."

~

The Court also noted that, although in Padilla's case the immigration
consequences were clear, in some situations the immigration consequences are
unclear.

~

In those situations, defense counsel still has a duty to advise a

noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may have negative immigration
consequences.

kl

Thus, the Court held that the seriousness and severity of

deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea make it critical that defense
counsel "inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation." Id. at
1486.
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2.

Padilla Created A New Rule 1

In collateral proceedings such as post-conviction "Idaho courts must
independently review requests for retroactive application of newly-announced
principles of law under the Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)] standard."
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130,136,233 P.3d 61, 67 (2010).
Under Teague, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court announcing a
new rule apply to all criminal cases still pending on direct review.
The new rule, however, only applies to final convictions in limited
circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively
because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant
stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or
faces punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. New
procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively because they
do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law
does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might
have been acquitted otherwise.
This is a more speculative
connection to innocence and, therefore, retroactivity is only given to
1

Courts are split as to whether Padilla announced a new rule and whether the
rule should be given retroactive effect. To date, three federal circuit courts have
addressed the issue, and the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have concluded that
Padilla is a new rule not entitled to retroactive effect. See Chaidez v. United
States, 655 F.3d 684 (th Cir. 2011 ); United States v. Chang Hong, -- F.3d --,
2011 WL 3805763 (10 th Cir. 2011 ). The Third Circuit has found that Padilla
simply applied the old Strickland rule, such that it was retroactively applicable on
collateral review. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640-42 (3 rd Cir. 2011).
Federal district courts are likewise split. Compare Doan v. United States, -F.Supp.2d --, 2011 WL 116811 at *3 (ED.Va. 2011) (Padilla states a new rule);
United States v. Hough, 2010 WL 5250996 at *3-4 (D.N.J. 2010) (same); United
States v. Perez, 2010 WL 4643033 at *2 (D.Neb. 2010) (same) with Marroquin v.
United States, 2011 WL 488985 at *2 (S.D.Tex. 2011) (Padilla does not state a
new rule); Luna v. United States, 2010 WL 4868062 at *3-4 (S.D.Cal. 2010)
(same); United States v. Shafeek, 2010 WL 3789747 at *3 (ED.Mich. 2010)
(same); Martin v. United States, 2010 WL 3463949 at *3 (C.D.III. 2010) (same);
Al Kokabani v. United States, 2010 WL 3941836 at *4-6 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (same);
United States v. Millan, 2010 WL 2557699 at *1 (N.D.Fla. 2010) (same). The
state submits the reasoning of the courts that have concluded Padilla created a
new rule is more persuasive, particularly in light of the applicable legal test for
determining whether a new rule has been created as discussed infra.
14

a small set of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

&

at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). See also

Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 191, 219 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If a
case is deemed to have announced a new rule, it will apply retroactively in a
collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a
watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceedings." (internal quotations omitted)).
Padilla created a new rule. A rule is new when it was not "dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague,
489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). A rule is old if a "court considering the
defendant's claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required
by the Constitution." O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (quotation
and brackets omitted).

The inquiry is whether Padilla's outcome was

"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407,415 (1990). In determining whether the outcome of a case was susceptible
to reasonable debate, the Supreme Court has looked to both the views
expressed in the opinion itself and lower court decisions.

"If the lower courts

were split on the issue, the Court has concluded that the outcome of the case
was susceptible to reasonable debate." Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 384,
2011 WL 3705173 at *4 (7 th Cir. 2011). See also Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.

In

addition, "[l]ack of unanimity on the Court in deciding a particular case supports
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the conclusion that the case announced a new rule." Chaidez at *4 (citing Beard
v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414-15, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (2004)).

a.

Lower Court Split

Prior to Padilla, lower courts were split as to whether an attorney must
advise his clients of deportation consequences. In Chaidez, the Seventh Circuit
explained:
Prior to Padil!a, the lower federal courts, including at least
nine Courts of Appeals, had uniformly held that the Sixth
Amendment did not require counsel to provide advice concerning
any collateral (as opposed to direct) consequences of a guilty plea.
Courts in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia had
reached this same conclusion. Such rare unanimity among the
lower courts is compelling evidence that reasonable jurists reading
the Supreme Court's precedents in April 2004 could have
disagreed about the outcome of Padilla.
Chaidez at *5 (internal citations and quotes omitted). It continued:
We acknowledge that the mere existence of conflicting authority
does not necessarily mean a rule is new. But, in our view, an
objective reading of the relevant cases demonstrates that Padilla
was not dictated by precedent. It is true that, unlike so many lower
courts, the Supreme Court has never applied a distinction between
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally reasonable professional assistance as required
under Strickland. As such, prior to Padilla, the Court had not
foreclosed the possibility that advice regarding collateral
consequences of a guilty plea could be constitutionally required.
But neither had the Court required defense counsel to provide
advice regarding consequences collateral to the criminal
prosecution at issue.

!9..c at *6 (internal citations

and quotes omitted).

In Idaho, like in the majority of jurisdictions, the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel did not require counsel to provide advice
concerning collateral consequences of a guilty plea. See Jakoski v. State, 136
16

Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The risk of deportation or
other impacts on immigration status was generally considered a collateral
consequence, albeit a "very significant consequence" for a defendant. State v.
Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402, 179 P.3d 363, 365 (Ct. App. 2008);
Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796-97, 874 P.2d 603, 607-608 (Ct. App.
1994).

Because

the

risk of deportation was

considered

a collateral

consequence, and an attorney had no duty to advise his clients of collateral
consequences, prior to Padilla an Idaho attorney had no obligation to advise his
clients of possible deportation consequences stemming from their guilty pleas.
That Idaho followed the majority rule in holding that an attorney did not generally
need to advise defendants of deportation consequences lends support to the
argument that the outcome of Padilla was "susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds."

b.

Lack Of Supreme Court Unanimity

Also weighing in favor of a conclusion that Padilla created a new rule is
the lack of unanimity on the Court in the Padilla case.

See Chaidez at *4.

Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in Padilla, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.

Justice Alito filed an opinion

concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Roberts joined. Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. As explained by the Seventh
Circuit, this lack of unanimity supports the conclusion that Padilla announced a
new rule:
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Statements in the concurrence leave no doubt that Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts considered Padilla to be groundbreaking.
See 130 S. Ct. at 1488, 1491, 1492 (referring to the majority's
holding as a "dramatic departure from precedent," "a major
upheaval in Sixth Amendment law," and a "dramatic expansion of
the scope of criminal defense counsel's duties under the Sixth
Amendment"). And the two dissenting Justices, who expressed the
view that the majority's extension of the Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence lacked "basis in text or principle," certainly did not
see Padilla as dictated by precedent. 130 S.Ct. at 1495 (Scalie, J.,
dissenting). See also Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236-37, 110 S.Ct. 2822.
Even the majority suggested that the rule it announced was not
dictated by precedent, stating that while Padilla's claim "follow[ed]
from" its decision applying Strickland to advice regarding guilty
pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d.
203 (1985), Hill "does not control the question before us." Id. at
1485n.12.
Chaidez at *4 (emphasis original). The Chaidez Court continued:
It seems evident from Supreme Court precedent that Padilla cannot
be an old rule simply because existing case law "inform[ed], or
even control[led] or govern[ed]," the analysis. Saffle, 494 U.S. at
488, 110 S.Ct. 1257. Nor will the rule of Padilla be deemed old
because precedent lent "general support" to the rule it established,
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236, 110 S.Ct. 2822, or because it represents
"the most reasonable ... interpretation of general law," Lambrix v.
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 538, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771
(1997). Padilla can only be considered an old rule if Supreme
Court precedent "compel[led] the result. Saff/e, 494 U.S. at 490,
110 S.Ct. 1257. The majority's characterization of Hill suggests
that it did not understand the rule set forth in Padilla to be dictated
by precedent.
~

(emphasis original). Thus, both the lack of unanimity between members of

the Supreme Court and the split among lower courts prior to Padilla support the
conclusion that Padilla created a new rule.
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3.

Padilla Does Not Meet Either Of The Exceptions To The
Retroactivity Bar

A new rule will apply retroactively to a final conviction only under limited
circumstances.

Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).

"A new rule

applies retroactively in collateral proceedings only if (1) the rule is substantive, or
(2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings." Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quotation and alteration omitted). New substantive rules
generally apply retroactively because they "necessarily carry a significant risk
that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal
or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." Rhoades, 149
Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70 (citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 352). New procedural
rules generally do not apply retroactively because "[t]hey do not produce a class
of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise
the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure
might have been acquitted otherwise."

&

(alteration in original).

The Rhoades

Court explained:
This is a more speculative connection to innocence and, therefore,
retroactivity is only given to a small set of watershed rules of
criminal procedure implicated the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceedings. The procedural rule must be
one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished.

&

(internal quotes and citations omitted).
A substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of

persons that the law punishes." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 139, 233 P.3d at 70
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(citing Schiro, 542 U.S. at 353). A procedural rule "regulate[s] only the manner of
determining the defendant's culpability."

~

(emphasis in original). The rule in

Padilla "regulates the manner in which a defendant arrives at the decision to
plead guilty." United States v. Chang Hong, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 3805763 at *8
(10th Cir. 2011 ). An individual who knows the full immigration consequences of a
guilty plea may choose instead to plead not guilty. As such, Padilla created a
procedural rule and the retroactivity exception for substantive rules does not
apply.

~

A procedural rule is only given retroactive effect if the new rule is a
watershed rule.
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of this standard shows that Padilla's rule is not "watershed."
The Tenth Circuit explained:
Padilla does not concern the fairness and accuracy of a
criminal proceeding, but instead relates to the deportation
consequences of a defendant's guilty plea. The rule does not affect
the determination of a defendant's guilt and only governs what
advice defense counsel must render when his noncitizen client
contemplates a plea bargain. Padilla would only be at issue in
cases where the defendant admits guilt and pleads guilty. In such
situations, because the defendant's guilt is established through his
own admission - with all the strictures of a Rule 11 plea colloquy Padilla is simply not germane to concerns about the risks of
inaccurate convictions or fundamental procedural fairness.

Chang Hong at *9.
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lcanovic cannot establish that there was "large risk of an inaccurate
conviction" under the rubric of law prior to Padilla.

Likewise, having counsel's

advice on immigration consequences does not "alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Indeed,
having that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision whether
to plead guilty or not. For these reasons, the new rule created in Padilla does not
fit either of the retroactivity exceptions, and Padilla should not be applied
retroactively in collateral proceedings. 2 Because lcanovic is not entitled to relief
as a matter of law, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of
lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief. 3

2

The state concedes that lcanovic was not given notice pursuant to I.C. § 194906 that his petition would be dismissed on the grounds that Padilla was not
retroactive. However, this Court exercises free review over questions of law,
State v. Rhoades, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010), and retroactivity is a
question of law. After a determination that Padilla is not retroactive, no further
purpose would be served by remanding the case to the district court. lcanovic is
not entitled to relief as a matter of law. "Where the lower court reaches the
correct result, albeit by reliance on an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the
order on the correct theory." Ridgely v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925,
930 (2010) (Although district court gave notice to dismiss on different theory,
dismissal was upheld where the lower court reached the correct result, albeit by
reliance on an erroneous theory; appellate court will affirm the order on the
correct theory.). Because the district court reached the correct result, this Court
should affirm the dismissal of lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief.
3

The state concedes that had lcanovic's attorney researched the law, he would
have discovered that a felony conviction for domestic violence results in
mandatory deportation.
See 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
Thus, although
counsel's advise was constitutionally sufficient prior to Padilla, if Padilla applies,
counsel's advice that lcanovic "might" or "might not" be deported was
constitutionally deficient because the immigration consequences were clear. The
state further concedes that the district court erred in holding that lcanovic's
attorney's inaccurate advice concerning immigration consequences was "cured"
by "advice" from the district court that he "may" be deported because that
"advice" was essentially the same as counsel's.
21

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
dismissal of lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.
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